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Abstract An expanding globalization causes global failures, similar to economy
failures encountered in the national economic system. Global failures take other
forms and are likely to be more severe in the future because of the entry in the world
scene of leading countries that have distinctly different economic systems (for
instance, China, India) from leading incumbents (US, EU), and because the new
competition (country cum system) is likely to be perceived by newcomers and
incumbents as a zero sum game. It is crucial in such circumstances to have a design
of world governance that can respond adequately to global failures. The G-20 is one
such design, but this is handicapped by its narrow scope (i.e. GDP) and undemo-
cratic composition (selection of individual countries and not regional representation,
next to being inconsistent and out of date). The paper formulates and applies an
index of influence potential that combines population and GDP, and which is
measurable at the region and country levels. The paper projects these applications
for the near future, comes up with more representative participations by
regions/countries in world governance and explores effects of the changing distri-
bution of influence potential on global development and economic systems.
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1 Introduction
In discussions in economic and political forums at the world level, there have been
an increasing interest in and lengthy discussions on the prospective major shifts in
the economic and political powers of leading countries in the world and their
implications for world governance. This discussion has focused on two premises:
that the relative size of a country’s GDP is the correct indicator of a country’s global
power and its rank in world leadership and that for running the world affaires it is
sufficient to focus on and consult with the few top leading individual countries. The
discussion is significant and has serious consequences for the shaping of world
governance. These two premises formed the basis for solutions and the shaping of
contemporary world governance. The latest development in world governance is the
establishment of the G-20, which is a forum of political leaders of the 20 leading
economies in the world, whereby qualification for inclusion in the top 20 is based on
a county’s rank in terms of the country’s size of the GDP.
The discussion and the forwarded solutions are flawed in two major respects.
One: there is obsession with the size of the GDP as the measure of economic and
political influence potential, with no attention to the population factor which is very
relevant in understanding global power and in managing world governance. Two:
there is the obsession of focusing on individual countries as the unit of analysis in
global issues, whereas world regions are more relevant for a better understanding
and policy making.
On the first count, the GDP criterion is a poor indication of the influence potential
of a particular country in the context of an interactive world of voluminous
populations. Interactive influence is not only the result of the relative size of
economic transformations but also the result of the relative size of the transforming
populations. There is a need to develop and apply a Dominance Index that
represents the influence potential more effectively.
On the second count, pronouncing and pushing forward individual countries with
the highest GDP as individual leading countries may not command global authority
or fair legitimacy because such an identification of individual leading countries does
not consider regional power or regional representation. The G-20 approach ignores
all the past progress made by mankind in defining constitutional democracy and
representational rights. The world cannot be seen as a loose collection of individual
countries. Any individual country is allied to other countries and is as such a
member of an interest group that has common interests. Responsive actions to
global failure would require global governance that is fairly representative of
regional and country interests. The division of the world in eight regions, which
coincides with the general consensus in international organizations, is our answer in
this paper to the representation problem.
This paper defines the problems of global power and world governance in terms
of system-based world regions that compete and cooperate in the economic,
political and social spheres, and in terms of economic and demographic driving
forces that determine the relative weights of competing regions. The outline of the
paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical framework for measuring global
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dominance via a Dominance Index that combines population size and GDP size and
that can measure dominance at the country and regional levels. Section 4 applies the
analytical framework to the world at large for the years 2000 and 2012. The
Dominance Index will be applied at various levels showing country influence,
interregional influence and intraregional influence. Section 5 uses projections and
forecasts for exploring future perspectives of global dominance in the few coming
decades. Section 5 uses the foregone analysis in discussing designs of global
governance. Section 6 ends with concluding remarks.
2 Measurement of Influence Potential by Country and Region
The study of global dominance is highly relevant, important and strategic and has
been receiving increasingly more attention. The relative size of the GDP of a
leading country has so far been serving as an indicator of global leadership and
dominance. The US has become the leading country not only in terms of having the
largest GDP, but also in view of its systemic dominance in the commercial,
monetary and financial spheres worldwide. Dominance in these spheres tends to
increase with a greater GDP. Moreover, global dominance in terms of political,
military and technological levels tends to associate with economic power as well.
There is thus a tendency for the dominant economy to become the core of the global
system, giving its national representatives more leverage in the determination of
world governance and the management of world affaires. Dominating countries
drive, carry, transport and transplant their own economic system baggage to other
countries elsewhere. Fourth, the future economic prospects of countries that are
competing for global leadership are crucial for their dominance prospects, may have
downgrading effects for the incumbent leaders and can create serious challenges to
the adaptation of world governance and management to the new situation.
Current approaches that single the relative size of the GDP of leading countries
as an indication of global dominance have been argued above as incomplete and
insufficient for two reasons:
(1) The GDP criterion is a poor indication of the influence potential of a particular
country in the context of an interactive world of voluminous populations.
Interactive influence is the combined result of the relative size of economic
transformations and the relative size of the transforming populations. There is
a need to develop and apply a Dominance Index that reflects these realities
(2) Pronouncing and pushing forward individual countries with the highest GDP
as individual leading countries may not command global authority or fair
legitimacy because such an identification of individual leading countries does
not consider regional power or regional representation.
In this section an analytical framework is formulated that considers these two
issues. First, the GDP is a biased indicator of dominance. Macro economics is more
concerned with the size of the transformed value added, i.e. the GDP, than the
numbers of agents who are engaged in the value added transformation. In contrast,
micro economic theory focuses on the agents (that is the population at large) who
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activate the value added transformations, consumption, investment and interactions
that eventually result in outcomes and influential patterns. In representing global
dominance, population matters at least as much as the GDP. The spectacular rise in
the GDP of China and India, which has prepared them to become leading countries,
is due for the largest part to the magnitude and growth of labour inputs, cf. Cohen
(2015). Each of the two countries has populations of around one billion or more. In a
globalizing world with an increasingly free movement of people and communica-
tion, population numbers carry influential power and are contribute to global
dominance. The influence potential of a unit in the whole is a complex matter and
cannot be fruitfully assessed without a systematization of concepts of influence
potential. In the study of economic systems, in Cohen (2009, 2015), a distinction is
made between two types of influence potential: interactive influence and regulative
influence. In both types of influences, it is essential to the jointly consider the GDP
factor and the population factor.
Interactive influence emerges from interacting agents and the transactions they
generate. Microeconomic foundations support formulating an interactive Domi-
nance Index that expresses the interactive influence potential of an entity y among
all the entities of the same kind y0. The Domiance Index is denoted by DI(y/y0). An
entity can be a firm, town, a country or a world region. In this paper we shall apply
this index to the contexts of countries and regions.
The index has two arguments as shown in Eq. 1: the relative share of agents, A, in
y among all y0, that is (Ay/RAy0); and the relative share of value added
transformations, V, in y among all y0, that is Vy/RVy0. In this equation, q1 and q2
are equal weighting rates applying to these two shares, whereby q1 ? q2 = 1 and
q1 = q2. Other weighting rates can be used.
DIðy=y0Þ ¼ q1ðAy=RAy0Þ þ qyðVy=RVy0 Þ ð1Þ
The value of DI for an entity y is a proportion, whereby R DI(y/y0) = 1. An entity
that scores a very high value of the index tends to dominate the other entities of the
same kind. Once the index for an entity reaches a critical mass the influence
potential of that entity can be expected to benefit from network externalities and to
become practically the dominant player among all member entities of the same set.
There are different views concerning the likely value of the critical mass for
becoming the dominant player. A value of 3/4th is among the most quoted in the
literature on a critical mass, cf. Simon (1993). There is thus justification for fixing
the value of this threshold at 0.8 or thereabout.
Regulative influence is the other type of influence potential. This refers to a
situation in which an entity or country y, happens to stand higher in relation to the
hierarchy of all countries y0; allowing y to set behavioural rules typical of y that
other countries y0 should abide with. In this way, the behavioural type of y overrides
y0, allowing the further spread of behavioural norms of y at the cost of those of y0. It
is not feasible to quantify measures of regulative influence along the lines of
interactive influence due to mounting difficulties in standardizing diversified
measures of regulation. It is likely that there is a positive association between the
two notions of influence potential, in the sense that a country powerful in interactive
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influence would in the long run become generally powerful in regulative influence.
This will add to the importance of the Domiance Index.
While interactive influence represents the results of horizontal contacts,
regulative influence is a vertical relationship. There is ground for speculating that
the nature of the horizontal channels makes their effect more endurable as they are
generated via experiencing, learning and adoption. The contribution of horizontal
channels towards converging behavioural patterns across countries is likely to be
more influential and more permanent than that of vertical channels. In the case of
vertically accommodated behavioural attitudes, the regulative influence can
terminate abruptly if the regulative mechanisms become too demanding due to
technological loopholes, or the rationale for the binding restrictions disappears, or
the balance of power between y and y0 reverses.
In this paper we adapt Eq. 1 towards Eq. 2 to give the Domiance Index of a
country c in all countries, that is, the world total, denoted by w. Note that entity y in
Eq. 1 is specified as country c in Eq. 2 and the sum of all entities y0 is specified as
the world, w. Equation 2 combines two share parameters to give the influence
potential of a particular country in an interactive world of all countries. The first is
the share of the population in country c, with respect to all populations in all
countries w. The second is the share of commodities transformed in country c, with
respect to all transformed commodities in all countries; in other words, the total
GDP of the world, w.
DIðc=wÞ ¼ q1ðAc=AwÞ þ qyðVc=VwÞ ð2Þ
Equation 2 states that the greater the combined shares of the population and the
GDP of a particular country in the world totals, the greater is the influence potential
of that country relative to other countries.
While the Domiance Index of a country in the world context cannot pretend to
cover all types of influences in the economic domain, not to mention influences in
the non-economic domains that have bearings on the economic sphere, it gives a
meaningful representation of the generally valid and widely recognized facts that
the larger the number of agents and the larger the size of the economic
transformation in one subsystem the greater the influence will be of that subsystem
in its interactions with other subsystems.
Second, the world cannot be seen as a loose collection of individual countries.
Any individual country is allied to other countries in a regional formation and is as
such a member of a regional interest group that has common interests. For instance,
the US conducts its world affaires and is viewed by others, as part of the western
advanced economies. The remedy to the country bias is to study global dominance
in an analytical framework that gives attention to interregional and intraregional
next to country dominance. It is both logical and realism that in constructing a
representative and real global governance the starting point should be the influence
potential of the world regions and not individual countries. Once that starting point
is resolved, the next step is to descent to regional representation that is indeed at the
country level.
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Adapting Eq. 1 towards measurement of interregional dominance gives Eq. 3
where entity y is specified as region r and all entities y0 are specified as all regions,
that is the world w.
DIðr=wÞ ¼ q1ðAr=AwÞ þ qyðVr=VwÞ ð3Þ
Similarly, adapting Eq. 1 towards measurement of intraregional dominance gives
Eq. 4 where entity y is specified as country c and all entities y0 are specified as all
relating countries in the same region r.
DI ðc=rÞ ¼ q1ðAc=ArÞ þ qyðVc=VrÞ ð4Þ
How do the three Domiance Indexes relate to each other? How do Eqs. 2, 3 and 4
combine? The Domiance Index of a country in the world, DI(c/w) as in Eq. 2, is
decomposable into two parts: the DI of leading regions r at the world level w, giving
thus DI (r/w) as in Eq. 3; and the DI for leading countries, c, at the regional level, r,
giving thus DI (c/r) as in Eq. 4. The decomposition is laid down in Eq. 5.
DI c=wð Þ ¼ DI r=wð Þ  DI c=rð Þ ð5Þ
While DI (r/w) can be described to stand for interregional dominance, DI (c/r)
represents intraregional dominance.
Application of Eqs. 3 and 4 would require a relevant and meaningful division of
the world, w, into regions r and the classification of countries c along these regions.
In Cohen (2015), the world economy is divided into eight regional groups based on
their shared type of economic system, common features and regional vicinity. Some
regional classification, see annex, should form the basis for composing a
constitutionally acceptable platform of a representative world government. The
annex distinguishes between two developed regions (the F-group consisting of firm-
centred western economies and the S-group consisting of state-centred economies
such as Russia and some former ex-Soviet Union countries) and six development
regions specified as East Asia and Pacific (EAP), South Asia (SA), Central Asia and
Caspian (CAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). The classification corresponds closely
with those operational at the World Bank and United Nations. Comparative
indicators on economic structures, conduct and performances of the eight regions
and their constituent countries are reported in Cohen (2015). The indicators relate to
attitudes towards business and the state, liberalized and discretionary conduct,
inward and outward orientations, growth and distribution patterns. These indicators
support the proposed classification as they display large differentiations at the
interregional level and low differentiations at the intraregional levels. Furthermore,
in each of the eight regions, there is evidence over the last two decades of a
convergence in indicator values among member countries of a region towards the
average values that hold for their specific region.
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3 Applications for 2000 and 2012
This section will apply DI for leading countries at the world level and will
subsequently treat the decomposition of the DI into interregional dominance and
intraregional dominance.
3.1 Leading Countries at the World Level
The relevant equation here is Eq. 2. Application of this equation for the years 2000
and 2012 gives the Domiance Index for (c/w) as shown in Table 1. The obtained
results can be described in four points. First, while in 2000 the DI of US preceded
China by 7 pp (18.3–11.0, column 3), this ranking reversed in 2012 with DI in
China at 15.4 and US at 13.7, due to higher growth in China of both the population
and GDP. The same applies for the relationship between Japan and India. While
Japan was ahead of India in the DI in 2000, this reversed in 2012.
Second, the DI of all F-countries amounted to 48.5 pp in 2000, with 30.4 held by
the non-European group (US, Japan, etc.) and 18.1 in the EU group. In 2012, the DI
of all F-countries is diminished 8 pp to become 39.3 pp with 23.1 held by the non-
European group and 16.2 held by the EU group. These figures show that within the
firm-centred countries, European countries have gained and non-European countries
have lost in influence potential, over the last decade.
Third, a striking fact is the significantly low influence potential of Russia at the
world level, which is only 2.4 pp. This is in the neighbourhood of the DI for
countries like France, UK, Indonesia and Brazil.
Fourth, for practically all countries in the years between 2000 and 2012, the
relative change in the GDP was greater than the relative change in the population
with the exception of the Sub-Saharan African countries where population growth
was greater than GDP growth. This means that while the change in a country
dominance is less accountable by demographic than economic growth, this is
reversed in the case of the African countries where demographic growth was larger
than economic growth.
3.2 Interregional Dominance
The relevant equation for this application is Eq. 3 which gives the DI of leading
regions r at the world level, that is, DI (r/w). Table 2 displays results of DI for the
two developed regions and the six development regions as fractions of the whole
world. The sum of DI over the eight regions is 100%. The most remarkable
development in the periods 2000–2012 is the reduction in the value of DI of the
developed regions. The firm-centred western countries (F-countries, i.e. US, EU,
Japan) have lost significantly with a reduction in their dominance of 18.7%. The
state-centred countries (S-countries, i.e. Russia) gained, mainly due to the recovery
after years of recession following the collapse of the communist regime, which does
not make it as a real advance. The main gainers and advancers are the development
regions. For example, DI for the advanced regions diminished from 50.7 in 2000 to
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42.2 in 2012 (a reduction of 16%, column 7) and the development regions reversed
their subordinate position of 2000 and acquired a majority in 2012 (as they moved
from 49.3–57.6). The DI of the development regions of EAP, CAC, MENA and
SSA increased by between 36 and 41%, and the increase in SA and LAC was lower
at 24 and 16%. If Table 2 would be computed for the world situation half a century
ago, a totally different picture would come out, with F-countries (i.e. the western
countries), S- countries (i.e. Soviet Union and allies) and the developing countries
having more or less equal levels of DI at 33% each.
3.3 Intraregional Dominance
The Dominance Index is also computable for individual countries within each
region, as in Eq. 4. The sum of the relative shares of population and GDP, when
applied to each country within a region, gives the degree of interactive influence of
each country in the region. The higher the index of a leading country the greater is
its influence in passing its behavioural features to other countries in the same region.
Table 3 shows leading country configurations in the two developed and six
development regions. In order not to enter into unnecessary details, we limit the
presentation to the two most leading countries in each region. Within the F-group,
the population is about evenly divided between non-European and European
countries. The share of the GDP that goes to non-European is about 10% higher than
the European, but this difference is shrinking. The result is a DI in 2012 that gives
the non-European a greater influence at 56% against the European at 44%. As the
last column shows, this difference shrank over the past 12 years by 2 percentage
Table 2 World regions: population shares, GDP shares and Domiance Index (%)
Population (%) GDP (%) Domiance Index
2000 2012 2000 2012 2000 2012 Change (%)
Developed regions 21.0 19.0 80.5 65.9 50.7 42.4 -16.4
Developing regions 79.0 81.0 19.5 34.1 49.3 57.6 16.8
Developed regions
F-countries 17.4 16.0 79.5 62.7 48.5 39.4 -18.7
S-countries 3.6 3.0 0.9 3.1 2.2 3.1 36.2
Developing regions
EAP 25.7 28.3 5.8 14.7 15.8 21.5 36.0
SA 19.6 23.4 1.9 3.2 10.8 13.3 23.5
CAC 2.7 3.2 1.2 2.4 2.0 2.8 39.6
MENA 3.5 4.5 2.6 4.1 3.1 4.3 40.5
SSA 9.4 13.0 1.0 1.8 5.2 7.4 41.0
LAC 7.5 8.6 6.9 8.0 7.2 8.3 16.3
World total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.0
World total values 6102 7044 32,873 72,682
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points (pp), suggesting that within the F-group, European countries have gained
while non-European countries, i.e. US and Japan, have lost in influence potential,
over the last decade.
Computation of the Domiance Index for the S-region shows Russia dominating
with a DI of 75.7% in 2000 and increasing to 78.3% in 2012. This is very close to
the situation where the threshold of 80% is likely to be passed, allowing an anchored
dominance. Other countries in the region have very limited and declining influential
powers.1
Table 3 Leading countries in world regions: population shares, GDP shares and Domiance Index (%)
Share in total population Share in total GDP Dominance Index
2000 2012 2000 2012 2000 2012 Change (%)
F-group
Non-European 50.8 51.9 65.4 60.5 58.1 56.2 -3.3
United States 27.9 29.2 39.9 36.3 33.9 32.7 -3.6
Japan 12.6 11.9 18.4 13.3 15.5 12.6 -18.6
European 49.1 48.1 34.6 39.5 41.9 43.8 4.5
Germany 8.1 7.5 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.6 -2.1
France 6.0 6.1 5.1 5.8 5.6 6.0 6.8
S-group
Russia 68 68 84 88 75.7 78.3 3.5
Ukraine 23 22 10 8 16.4 14.7 -10.2
EAP
China 69.5 67.7 71.7 80.1 70.6 73.9 4.6
Indonesia 11.4 12.3 8.6 8.2 10.0 10.3 2.5
SA
India 75.4 75.0 76.1 80.7 75.8 77.8 2.7
Pakistan 10.4 10.9 11.8 9.8 11.1 10.3 -7.1
CAC
Turkey 32.9 32.9 65.0 46.1 48.9 39.5 -19.3
Iran 34.3 34.0 24.7 32.3 29.5 33.1 12.3
MENA
Egypt 26.9 25.5 11.5 8.8 19.2 17.2 -10.5
Saudi Arabia 8.2 8.8 21.7 23.9 15.0 16.4 9.5
SSA
Nigeria 18.5 18.5 13.5 19.8 16.0 19.1 19.8
South Africa 6.6 5.7 38.6 28.9 22.6 17.3 -29.1
LAC
Brazil 33.2 32.6 28.5 38.6 30.9 35.6 15.4
Mexico 19.8 19.9 30.6 20.2 25.2 20.0 -20.5
1 In this paper, the Russian-led S-group includes Ukraine. In updating the classification, and in the light
of recent political developments, it would seem justifiable to remove Ukraine from the Russian influence
sphere. Because of the small size of Ukraine, exclusion of Ukraine would not significantly affect the
obtained empirical results for this region.
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In the EAP region, in 2012, China constituted 80.1% of the total population and
73.9% of the total GDP, resulting in a DI of 74%; in 2000, the DI was 71%, a rise by
5 pp. Indonesia follows with a long distance at DI of 10% that is maintained at that
level in 2012. The huge size and the positive change of DI in China mean that DI in
most other EAP countries is not only tiny, but is shrinking as well.
In the SA region, in 2012, India has about 75% of the total population and stands
stable at this share. The ratio of (GDP of India)/(GDP of SA) is 80.7% and had a
rising tendency. Taken together, DI for India in 2000 was at 76% in 2000 and rose to
78% in 2012. The next country is Pakistan with a DI index of 11% and has been
falling. Other countries show also a decreasing DI, last column.
In the Central Asia and Caspian region, CAC, Turkey and Iran are numbers one
and two, with DI at 49 and 30% in 2000, but the gap closed down rapidly to give,
respectively, 40 and 33% in 2012. The dominance profile in CAC can be described
as that of a majority-based duo leadership, which allows the two leading countries to
exercise major influences. The duo leadership can lead to rivalry between Turkey
and Iran in acquiring more economic and political influences in this and
neighbouring regions.
In MENA, the two leading countries are Egypt and Saudi Arabia; they mastered
in 2012 less than one-third of the total population of the region and accounted for
only about one-third of the total GDP. Their DI’s are limited to 17 and 16%,
respectively. The sum of this duo leadership does not go beyond 33%. The
dominance profile of MENA is best described as a minority-based duo leadership.
Various factors such as the sparsely populated vast space, transport barriers, unequal
resource endowments, nationalist sentiments driven by foreign interventions and
public approvals of authoritarian governments tended to undermine the otherwise
highly unifying factors such as common language, religious and cultural traits.
The sparsely spread distribution pattern of DI among the member countries in
SSA is similar to that in MENA and is best described as a minority-based duo
leadership. Together, the two leaders, which are Nigeria and South Africa,
command a dominance of only 36%. Cultural, religious, political and not least
geophysical barriers stand in the way of greater interaction and integration between
SSA countries and restrict the eventual enlargement of dominating influences of
leading countries.
The LAC region, consisting of 41 countries, has a majority-based duo leadership
similar to the case of the CAC region. The two leaders are Brazil with DI at 36%
and Mexico at 20%. Together, these two leading countries command a DI of 56%.
Although leadership patterns in the country/region context differ between the
regions, some common features are present, significant and meaningful in
understanding and managing world development. One feature is that the DI of
US as the leading country in the F-region is at 33%, which compares very poorly
with DI for leading countries in the S-region, in EAP and in SA, that is, Russia at
78%, China at 74% and India at 78%, respectively. It is directly seen that the degree
of influence which US can practice in the F-region is much more limited than what
the other three countries can do in their respective regions. The influential power of
Russia, China and India in their regional groups is more than twice the influential
power of US in the F-group (i.e. 74/33 = 2.2). Although Russia dominates the
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S-region by 78%, it is a special case. The S- region itself has become quite tiny in
the total world stage, with a modest DI at 3%.
A second feature is that one can speak of a majority-shared duo leadership in the
regions of CAC and LAC (with leading countries Turkey and Iran in CAC, and
Brazil and Mexico in LAC). Country leadership in these two regions is highly
contested. The leadership pattern is otherwise in the regions of MENA and SSA,
which are characterized by minority- shared duo leaderships. The combined DI of
leading countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia in MENA, and Nigeria and South
Africa in SSA do not go beyond 33 and 36%. The dispersed DI in these two regions
is a reflection of multi-faceted fragmentations. Various intraregional barriers stand
in the way of regional integration.
4 Projections into the Future
The future distribution of potential influence among competing regions and leading
countries as expressed in the Dominance Index will change, and this can have
significant impacts on world development and world governance. In this and the
next section, we project the main tendencies in the distribution of DI among regions
and countries in the near future and examine world governance in the light of these
projections.
To compute the Dominance Index for leading countries in future years, one needs
projections of the population shares and the GDP shares of leading countries in the
world’s total population and GDP, respectively. United Nations Demographic
Division is the primary source for population projections. Reference is made to
PWC Economics (2013) as our source of projections for the GDP. The projections
make use of essentially the same modeling methodology applied in Wilson and
Purushothaman (2003). These two types of projections, see ‘‘Appendix 2 and 3’’, are
employed to compute DI for leading countries for 2030 and 2050. Results in
Table 4 show that sometime between 2000 and 2012, the DI of China surpassed US
already, and by 2030 India, is projected to be equal to, and thereafter surpass US. In
2030, China and India are numbers 1 and 2, followed by US, and after a distance,
come Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria and Mexico. The DI of leading EU countries
is in the range 2.0–1.5%. The DI of Russia and Turkey are also in this range. All
other countries in the rest of the world, next to Saudi Arabia and South Africa, are
projected have the DI at levels lower than 1%. Countries in the rest of the world
hold together a DI amounting to 34 pp, which is projected to be stable.
Just as important, and perhaps even more relevant, is the projection of DI by world
regions, since the regional leadership dimension adds crucial influential significance
to the country leadership dimension. The influence potential of the eight regions as
indicated by calculations of DI (r/w) in the years 2012, 2030 and 2050 is projected in
Table 5. The same sources as in Table 4 were used to make the projections.
The focus of the presented results is to view the changing world development and
influence spheres from the angle of regional influences, hence their reproduction in
Fig. 1. While the displacement discussions have been preoccupied with the situation
of individual countries, such as China and India versus US, EU and Japan, we
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contend here that deliberations on global governance are better served when the
focus is on world groups rather than on individual countries. Figure 1 shows the
F-group of countries to be continued dominating in 2012, 2030 and 2050 as well. In
2050, the value of DI for the F-group is projected at 25.6 pp, which is slightly
higher but practically equal to the DI of EAP at 24.8 pp. This is a projected future
situation of shared leadership that has a trajectory of some 38 years before the
shared leadership is to be realized. The lengthy horizon of the trajectory gives ample
opportunities for the two leading regional groups to adapt to each other in
redesigning global governance and responding collectively to challenges of global
failures.
Would intercourse between parties with equal influential powers lead to more
confrontation or more understanding? It is generally true that when the contending
parties have influential powers that are more or less equal, as suggested in Fig. 1 for
2050, and perceive the situation as such, the parties will be more inclined to use
reason and knowledge and adopt cooperative attitudes in managing collective
actions and avoiding bilateral frictions. Under a skew distribution of influential
Table 5 Projected distribution of the Dominance Index by world region: 2012, 2030, 2050
2012 2030 2050
F-group 39.4 F-group 30.6 F-group 25.6
EAP 21.5 EAP 25.0 EAP 24.8
SA 13.3 SA 15.0 SA 18.2
LAC 8.3 LAC 9.2 LAC 9.6
SSA 7.4 SSA 8.5 SSA 9.6
MENA 4.3 MENA 5.3 MENA 6.2
S-group 3.1 CAC 3.4 CAC 3.7
CAC 2.8 S-group 2.8 S-group 2.5
World total 100.0 World total 100.0 World total 100.0
2012 2030 2050
Key: 1 = F-group,  2 = S-group,  3 = EAP,   4 = SA,  5 = CAC,  6 = MENA,  7 = SSA,  8 = LAC  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 7 
8 
1 
2 
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Fig. 1 Projected distribution of the Dominance Index by world region: 2012, 2030, 2050
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powers, it is more likely that a non-collaborative attitude emerges. Figure 1 predicts
a future world in 2050 with a more equal balance of influence than in 2012 and thus
feeds the expectation that in the long run the new country/systems competition will
be more collaborative. Furthermore, the collaborative scenario is collectively
superior to an isolationist, protectionist or a non-collaborative one. The collabo-
rative scenario promotes borrowing, testing and adaptation of successful institutions
from one system to another, but also experimenting with new designs and
institutions of global governance.
It is worth mentioning that the South Asia region is projected at the third position
with DI at 18 pp and LAC at the fourth position with DI at 10 pp. The displacement
at the regional level is thus less striking than the displacement at the country level.
Figure reveals other interesting features of world development as well. The
underdog position of SSA is reversed by 2050, allowing SSA to catch up with LAC
with the same influence potential of 10 pp. MENA and CAC secure the sixth and
seventh positions with DI at 6 pp and 4 pp, respectively. The S-group, which is
practically Russia, reaches no more than 2.5 pp, which is equivalent to one-tenth of
the influence potential of either EAP or F-group.
In what ways would the projected displacement of US, EU and Japan by China
and India affect the economic systems of the leading incumbent countries and the
economic systems of the leading newcomer countries? And how could the projected
displacement affect world development and world governance?
In discussing these questions, it is necessary first to sum up the crucial features of
the socio-economic systems of US and EU as contrasted to those of China and India.
As is well known, profit maximizing firms, markets and supportive institutions are
the main driving agents in the US and EU, hence our denotation of countries sharing
this system by the F-group. In contrast, institutional behaviour in China and India
incorporates greater influences from kinship and household settings when compared
to US and EU. There is also greater collaboration between the higher strata of the
firm and state subsystems in China and India compared to US and EU; this closer
collaboration between firm and state agents at the top is partly due to close kin
relationships between leading agents in leading firms and state agencies. Further-
more, persuasion settings seeking consensus are much more active in coordinating
and streamlining the social system in China and India than in US and EU, which is
logical, given the demographic dynamics and the multi-polar differentiation of the
social system in these two giant countries.
As the projections favouring the newcomers on the incumbents become a reality,
the established institutions in US and EU are likely to come under pressure in such
institutional areas as separation between business and government, free competition,
transparent governance, merit goods and social benefits of the welfare state. The
fiscal budget may shift in favour of capital and firms at the cost of labour and
consumers. The national economies are prone to apply more protectionism,
cartelism and state corporatism. The polity may also be affected by a weakening of
decision-making in open parliaments and strengthened non-transparencies. The new
country/system competition may work otherwise and motivate firms and states in
F-countries to come closer, integrate and reorganize with the object of raising
performance of their national economies; see Sinn (2002) and Lindbeck (2003) for
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elaborations on consequences of the new systems competition and protectionism.
The reorganization in F-countries may borrow features of the leading newcomers.
Firm-centred countries may let go and replace parts of the profit maximizing
institutions with coordination mechanisms that rely on community sharing,
politicized rent and persuasive settings. How far would this adaptation go? One
view is that fundamental changes in F-countries cannot happen because given the
embedded character of firm-oriented institutions; the cost of reorganization is higher
than the benefit of breaking away from the embedded institutions and the historical
path. The other view, based on interactive influence, allows for open-ended
indeterminate courses, dependent on the degree of agent participation across the
world regions and across competing regional systems, and if the returns in the
competing regional systems are higher agents would either physically move to the
better performing regional system or institutionally redirect their own system to
incorporate elements from elsewhere. It very much depends on the relative shares of
the dissatisfied versus loyalists.
The new country/system competition would have also consequences for leading
newcomers. Given their growth premium in the future, there may be less incentive
for the newcomer country/systems to incorporate, test or adapt some of the
institutions that proved successful in the context of the F-countries such as those of
the competitive entrepreneurship, welfare state, medical insurance and parliamen-
tary democracy. This would imply a low degree of interaction between the
economic systems that limits their evolution. But if the incumbent leading countries
in the F-group would take initiating steps in an adaptation process, this can engage
leading newcomers in a mutual process of co-adaptations and co-integration, which
would make global governance a lot easier.
Speculation on what will happen in the future, considering the huge uncertainties
in world development and the multitudes of intervening factors, is not a worthwhile
activity and loses relevance in terms of developing action rationales and policy
intentions. What is more relevant in terms of policy is to bolster favourable
conditions for all agents in all regional systems so as to allow agents to digest,
compare and evaluate what is happening across the regional systems, and so as to
allow agents to decide freely on entering, exiting, voicing or reforming across the
regional systems. Whatever outcome is realized at the end of the day regarding the
prospects of a particular regional system is logical and defendable if the outcome is
the result of fair starts, undistorted processes, comparative evaluations and rational
choices. These conditions are vital for the natural evolutions of the regional systems
and for creating unbiased and fluid world governance that strives towards resolving
global failures.
5 Exploring Designs for Global Governance
Technical and behavioural barriers that exist at the national level and that lead to
economy failures at the national level are also present at the regional and world
levels though in different and more complex forms. Global failures (such as risky
finance, economic recessions and trade protectionism; misuses due to tax havens
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and divergent monetary and regulatory regimes; global warming, cyber insecurity,
war refugees, health hazards, whale protection and so forth) are imminent, thus
requiring global governance that fixes indivisibilities, promotes confidence,
internalizes externalities and organizes collective actions to attend to newly arising
collective needs at the global level. The global failures are even more likely to
accentuate as the incumbent and newcomer countries that dominate world
development feature different economic systems, institutions and behaviours. The
conviction is that there is an urgent need to reset and to redesign global governance
so as to fit with the changing distribution of global dominance and influence
potentials, so as to address the mounting list of global failures and take responsive
global actions to contain these global failures.
The current world governance system was shaped in the advent of WWII and has
undergone a few additions changes since then. The United Nations assembly
consists of 193 member states. The UN Security Council, UNSC, consists of five
permanent members with veto rights: China, France, Russian Federation, the UK,
and the United States and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms
by the General Assembly. These are currently Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile,
Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Korea and Rwanda. This list of 5 plus 10
members of the Security Council looks obscure and uninformed when evaluated
against the background of our findings on the Dominance Index in the world at
large.
Next to the UNSC, there are permanent international agencies on trade, finance,
law, and major areas of social and economic activities and intermittent conferences
on newly rising global challenges. The latest development in world governance is
the establishment of the G-20, which is a forum of political leaders of the 20 leading
economies in the world, whereby a county’s rank is defined in terms of the country’s
size of the GDP. The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the United States and the
European Union. Spain is an honorary member. Together, they represent about two-
thirds of the world’s population, 85% of global gross domestic product and over
75% of global trade. The president of G-20 rotates annually. Each year the G20
president invites several guest countries to participate in G20 events and contribute
to the agenda. The work of G20 members is supported by several international
organizations that provide policy advice. The G20 also regularly engages with the
non-state sectors. Even though the selection of the G-20 country members is not
fully consistent with their GDP figures,2 the G-20 is an important addition to world
governance, but it far from being a fair and effective selection for the two reasons
we emphasize in this paper, namely the built-in bias for a country approach instead
2 This is not the case with G-20, which includes countries that do not qualify for the inclusion criteria and
excludes others which do qualify, pointing thus to manipulated selections For instance, Netherlands ranks
as number 18 in the world GDP, but it is not included. Latest estimates of the GDP show Nigeria to
surpass South Africa, but South Africa is included and Nigeria is excluded. The inclusion of Argentina is
also disputed as its GDP does not fall in the top 20. Next to EU individual countries, the EU as a whole is
also a member, which involves double counting. Spain is added as a hosing country. The number is
actually 22 and not 20.
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of the regional approach, and the non-transparent sole reliance on GDP in defining
economic and political power instead of applying a rigorous and transparent
Domiance Index in terms of the relative sizes of the GDP and population.
The point is reached now to demonstrate how the composition of a world top of
presidential leaders (to be entrusted with coordinating global governance and
resolving global failure) along the lines of findings in this paper would look like.
The alternative list will be very different from that of G-20, for several reasons.
First, we employ influence potential based on population and GDP, which is more
democratic and more real. Second, our starting point will be regional representation,
followed by naming countries, which is more democratic and logical.
‘‘Appendix 4’’ applies a step-by-step approach in constructing the alternative list.
Subject to explicitly set minimum and maximum rules, the outcome regarding
representation is transparent and listing of the G-16 leading countries. As the
influence potential of countries changes over time, the list would require updating,
which implies establishing a scheme of changing membership based on influential
power. The alternative list turns to have 16 members, which is less and more
compact than the 22 members of the G-20. Application results in the following
membership: US, Japan, Germany, France, UK (for F-group), Russia (for S-group),
China, Indonesia (for EAP), India, Pakistan (for SA), Turkey (for CAC), Saudi
Arabia (for MENA), Nigeria, South Africa (for SSA) and Brazil, Mexico (for LAC).
The G-16 allows also for shared/rotating memberships in the case of some regions,
as indicated in the bottom line of ‘‘Appendix 4’’.
Notwithstanding, the alternative list of G-16 leading countries accounts only for
about two-thirds of the full scale of the world DI, with the rest of the countries, about
180 controlling one-third of the world DI. There is a rationale for supplementing the
G-16, which can be called the first chamber, by a second chamber of regional
ambassadors who can represent the interests of smaller countries in the region other
than those of the leading countries, c. A chamber of eight regional ambassadors (say,
the presidents of the such regional organizations as the EU, Asean for EAP, Sarc for
SA,Oau for SSA,ArabLeague forMENA,Mercosur for LAC) can be instituted to that
effect, and it can convene on a regular basis in much the same way as the G-16 and
cooperate together in fixing global governance and global failures. The notion of two
chambers, which is a conventional practice in national governance, is also applicable
and adaptable to world governance.
In appraising the G-20 versus the G-16, it is important to emphasize that in both
configurations the current top dominant countries, US and EU, are expected to be
replaced within a couple of decades by newcomers such as China and India whose
political and economic systems are differently orientated than the leading
incumbents, and hence the current governance rules of any G-combination need
to adapt to different orientations. Functionality requires that world governance
should reflect not only the current but also the prospective influential power of the
dominating country (ies)/systems; hence, institutions of world governance need to
be forward looking in terms of both representation and rules. The G-20, in both its
composition and operation, when compared to the G-16, is not sufficiently forward
looking and underestimates the pace and magnitude of the leadership replacement
tendencies.
World Governance and Leadership Designs for the Future 373
123
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Country dominance can be specified in different ways; some ways more useful than
others.Wemake use of a generalized notion of influence potential, which is expressed in
terms of the relative shares of agent interaction and economic transformation, equally
weighted, andgiving thus theDominance Index,DI.Displacement of incumbent leading
countries bynewcomerswhenmeasured along comparativeDI’s of competing countries
occurs at a quicker pace thanwhenmeasured solely in termsof theGDP; this is due to the
population effect in DI that favours developing over developed countries. Results of DI
indicate that the displacement has already occurred, as theDI ofChina is higher than that
of US in 2012, i.e. 15.4 and 13.7 pp, respectively.
The country Domiance Index at the world level, that is DI of country/world, is
decomposable into DI of country/region (this reflects intraregional dominance) and DI
of region/world (reflecting interregional dominance). The decomposition adds insights.
Regarding intraregional dominance, US has a low dominance of 33% in its
region, when compared to such countries as China, India and Russia that score very
high degree of dominance in their regions, i.e. DI around 75%. The results suggest
that in relative terms, the influence potential of the US in global matters is hampered
by its low intraregional dominance, while the other three countries command more
influence in their respective regions.
Regarding interregional dominance, leadership displacement of the western indus-
trialized region by the EAP region is projected to take place at a much slower rate than in
the case of country displacement of US versus China. The displacement calculus in this
paper predicts that the western industrialized region (which we also call the firm-centred
region) and the EAP regionwill have equivalent DI’s in 2050, at 25.6 pp and at 24.8 pp,
respectively. The interesting thing about this projected equal sharing of influence is that
when the contending parties have influential powers that are more or less equal, as
suggested in Fig. 1, and perceive the situation as such, the partieswill bemore inclined to
use reason and knowledge and adopt cooperative attitudes inmanaging collective actions
and in avoiding bilateral frictions. Under skew distributions of influential powers, it is
more likely that a non-collaborative attitude emerges. The obtained results feed
expectations that in the long run the new regional system competition will be more
collaborative, a situation that promotes borrowing, testing and adaptation of successful
institutions from one regional system to another. With a time span of 38 years to go, the
resetting of rules of global governance can be done gradually, andworld responses to the
mounting global failures can be made more effective and timely.
For democratic and effectively run world governance, the interregional perspective
should precede the intraregional and country perspectives. Global governance, in
contrast to the more advanced organization of the national polity, is at an early stage of
evolvement and is far from being in shape to tackle the list of mounting global failures.
By way of demonstration, we applied the DI at the regional and country levels in
composing a world top of presidential leaders, to be entrusted with coordinating global
governance and resolving global failure. The result was a first chamber with the limited
number of 16 leading countries, or G-16, which is more compact, representative and
effectively real than the G-20. It was postulated also that there is a rationale for
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supplementing theG-16 by a second chamber of eight regional ambassadors, call it R-8,
which can represent the interests of other countries in the eight regions other than those
of the leading country.
As world development evolves, partly determined by internal mechanisms, and
partly by external events, the outcomes are not predictable. That is the more reason for
strengthening global governance based on principles of participatory democracy and
interactive influence. The context of the world national polity is very different from that
of the world polity. Remarkable advances have been achieved in the past centuries in
circumventing and consolidating the institutional set-up of the national polity. Some of
these advances can be fruitfully used in programming the institutions of global
governance, but the global governance of differentiated and interactive systems/
regions/countries is unique and new, and it has to discover its own programme and path.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: The World Regions
Distinguished
regions/countries
Specification of countries included Modifications to WB
databank
Firm-centred developed countries (F-group)
America-high
income
USA, Canada. Total 2 countries None
Europe- high
income
EU et al. extended to include next to EU all other
European countries not included elsewhere. Total
44 countries and/territories
EU et al. renamed,
extended
EAP-high income None
LAC- Latin America 
& Caribbean
MENA-Middle East &
North Africa
SSA- Sub 
Saharan Africa
SA- South 
Asia
CAC-Central
Asia & Caspian
F-group: USA, CAN, EUROPEAN UNION et al
JPN, KOR AUS, SGP, NZL et al
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Distinguished
regions/countries
Specification of countries included Modifications to WB
databank
Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei
Darussalam, French Polynesia, New Caledonia
and Singapore. Total 8 countries
State-oriented developed countries (S-group)
Russia and Russian
tied
countries(RRTC)
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine. Total 6 countries
Newly introduced region
Development regions
East Asia and
Pacific (EAP)
All income levels excluding EAP-high income:
China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea DR, Lao
PDR, Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar,
Mongolia, Papua NG, Philippines, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, Vietnam and other Oceania small
territories, islands. Total 26 countries
None
South Asia (SA)A All income levels: India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Total 8 countries
None
Central Asia and
Caspian (CAC)
Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz R,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Total 8
countries
Newly introduced region
Middle East and
North Africa
(MENA)
All income levels: Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain,
Djibouti, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UA Emirates, Yemen.
Total 19 countries
Malta and Iran deleted and
assigned to EU and
CAC, respectively
Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA)
All income levels in Africa: Nigeria, South Africa,
etc. except Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and
Tunisia, which are included in MENA. Total 48
countries
None
Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC)
All income levels in Latin American and the
Caribbean: Brazil, Mexico, etc. Total 41
countries
None
Appendix 2: Projections of Population Shares, GDP Shares
and Dominance Index
Population (%) GDP (%) DI
2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050
US 4.68 4.34 4.26 22.75 18.57 16.39 13.7 11.5 10.3
Japan 1.9 1.47 1.17 8.35 5.41 3.48 5.1 3.4 2.3
Germany 1.2 0.94 0.76 4.80 3.47 2.51 3.0 2.2 1.6
France 0.98 0.77 0.67 3.66 3.02 2.46 2.3 1.9 1.6
UK 0.95 0.74 0.63 3.47 2.87 2.41 2.2 1.8 1.5
Russia 2.04 1.48 1.12 2.77 3.20 3.07 2.4 2.3 2.1
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Population (%) GDP (%) DI
2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050
China 19.13 17.88 15.68 11.74 19.34 20.91 15.4 18.6 18.3
Indonesia 3.48 3.42 3.34 1.21 1.96 2.56 2.3 2.7 3.0
India 17.56 16.99 16.86 2.56 6.29 11.60 10.1 11.6 14.2
Turkey 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.09 1.67 1.93 1.1 1.4 1.5
S. Arabia 0.4 0.54 0.64 0.98 1.14 1.28 0.7 0.8 1.0
Nigeria 2.40 2.66 2.99 0.361 1.20 1.49 1.4 1.9 2.2
S. Africa 0.74 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.74 1.01 0.6 0.6 0.8
Brazil 2.82 2.73 2.65 3.09 3.88 3.86 3.0 3.3 3.3
Mexico 1.72 1.63 1.57 1.62 2.25 2.89 1.7 1.9 2.2
Others 38.96 42.78 46.08 31.04 24.99 22.14 35.0 33.9 34.1
world total 100 100.00 100.00 100 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.0 100.0
value 7044 8,214 9322 72,682 125,914 231,871
Appendix 3: Projections of Regional Distributions of Population, GDP
and Dominance Index
Population share (%) GDP share (%) Dominance Index (%)
2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050 2012 2030 2050
F-countries 16.0 13.6 12.3 62.7 48.6 39.7 39.4 30.6 25.6
S-countries 3.0 2.2 1.6 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5
EAP 28.3 26.7 23.8 14.7 24.2 26.6 21.5 25.0 24.8
SA 23.4 22.6 22.5 3.2 7.9 14.5 13.3 15.0 18.2
CAC 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.4 3.7 4.3 2.8 3.4 3.7
MENA 4.5 6.1 7.2 4.1 4.8 5.4 4.3 5.3 6.2
SSA 13 13.2 14.5 1.8 3.9 5.0 7.4 8.5 9.6
LAC 8.6 8.3 8.0 8 10.4 11.5 8.3 9.2 9.6
World total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
World values 7,044 8214 9322 72,682 125,914 231,871
Source: the consolidated growth rate of the leading countries within a regional
group between t and t ? 1 is applied to the initial share of the regional group in t to
obtain its projection for t ? 1, and similarly between t ? 1 and t ? 2. This was
done for the population shares in columns 2 and 3 and for the GDP shares in
columns 4 and 5. The Domiance Index is the average of population shares and GDP
shares. The years 2012, 2030 and 2050 are denoted by t, t ? 1, t ? 2.
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The interesting thing about the number of 20 is that when the full range of the
Domiance Index of 100 pp is divided by 20, this gives right to claim one position in
G-20 for a bunch of 5 pp on the Domiance Index. The table below displays regional
DI’s in row 1 and dividing by 5, the regional are obtained in row 2.
A number of refinements can be applied to this table. The rounding off of the
regional claims guarantees the S-region and CAC one position each even though
their claim is 0.6 of a position each, but that means that world leadership positions is
increased to 22. The rounding off of the claims is in row 3.
The next refinement relates to applying maximum and minimum rules for
regional inclusion in the world top. In filling the regional quota with leading
countries, it is logical to keep to indivisibility principles, which means that a
qualifying country can claim/send one position/president only irrespective of the
height of its DI (this can be viewed as fixing a maximum) and that a minor country
cannot obtain a position just because it belongs to a region with a high quota that is
boosted by membership of a super power. For example, EAP has high quota because
of China and Indonesia. This should not give Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam the
advantage of inclusion in the world top, unless such a country manifests a high DI of
its own. A similar situation applies to SA where India outflanks its neighbours. For
inclusion, indivisibility requires thus fixing a minimum DI for country/region, of say
5%. Application of maximum and minimum rules gives row 4.
The application so far reduces the membership positions of EAP and SA below
their regional claims, by 3 seats. Interregional fairness would require applying an
equivalent reduction of membership positions of the F-group from its regional
claim, from 8 to say 5. This results in a total membership of 16 seats as shown in
row 5, which is more operational than 20.
The G-16 countries roll out automatically from applying the above accommo-
dations to the DI results for 2012. The outcome is specified in the table below, row
6.
There are instances in some regions where the included country has a DI that is
marginally higher but practically equal to that of the next country in line. Turkey is
marginally higher than Iran in the CAC region. The same applies for Saudi Arabia
and Egypt in MENA. Intraregional fairness may require shared or rotating
membership in the G-16, as displayed in row 7.
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